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Abstract: This paper describes the salient features of the New Capital Accord and its 
implications for regulators in small jurisdictions. It is argued that the provisions of the 
Accord will have to be implemented in small jurisdictions in spite of the fact that they 
were intended primarily for banks operating internationally. This is likely to create a 
number of problems for regulators in such jurisdictions concerning primarily the 
interpretation of the Accord, the exchange of information and the collection of data of 
sufficient quality for the purposes of the Accord. 
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Introduction 
 
The regulation of financial services, particularly that with respect to banking, is a 
constantly evolving process. Supranational institutions such as the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS)¹, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank – 
particularly through their joint Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) – the 
European Commission (EU) immediately come to mind as being the drivers in the global 
development for more comprehensive prudential regulatory and supervisory standards. 
 
It has been the general practice, especially up to a decade ago, for regulators (including 
the entities mentioned above) to devise new prudential and systemic regulator standards² 
aimed at enhancing the safety and soundness of financial institutions largely in response 
to the increasingly sophisticated products and techniques churned out by the world’s 
larger banks and other financial institutions coming predominantly from developed 
countries. Moreover, while regulatory initiatives are frequently developed and 
implemented after a relatively long incubation process, these are being formulated in an 
environment characterized by a rapidly changing background of financial innovation. All 
this implies that, inevitably, the regulatory response tends to be more a reactive one rather 
than a proactive one. 
 
A significant example that illustrates this drawback in the prudential regulatory 
framework is the 1988 Basel Capital Accord (hereafter the 1988 Accord) which provides 
that G-10 internationally active banks would have a minimum 8% risk-weighted capital 
adequacy ratio. “The agreement was made against a background of concerns about a 
decline in capital held by banks and worries that banks from some jurisdictions were 
seeking a short-term competitive advantage by maintaining too low a level of capital” 
(Jackson and Emblow, 2001: 119). Although the 1988 Accord has often been described 
as being a milestone in the history of banking regulation, it has received widespread 
criticism to the effect that, at best, its somewhat simplified methodology regarding the 
risk weighting of assets is a very crude measure of economic risk. This is primarily 
because degrees of credit risk disclosure are not sufficiently calibrated as to adequately 
differentiate between borrowers’ differing default risks (June 1999 proposal by Basel 
Committee as quoted in The Banker, April 2001: 6). 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
1. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a committee of banking supervisory authorities, which 
was established by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1975. It consists of senior 
representatives of bank supervisory authorities 
and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. It usually meets at the Bank for 
International Settlements in Basel, where its permanent 
Secretariat is located. 
 
2. Prudential regulation concerns the safety and soundness of financial institutions vis-àvis consumer 
protection while systemic regulation is about the safety and soundness of financial institutions for purely 
systemic reasons (see Goodhart et al, 1998: 5). 
 
 
This inability of the 1988 Accord to distinguish clearly between investment grade 
borrowers and junk borrowers could have possibly contributed to entice some financial 
institutions to be more risk-seeking, instead of helping them control their risks. Another 
related problem with the existing 1988 Accord is the ability of banks to arbitrage their 
regulatory capital requirement and exploit differences between the true economic risk and  
risk measured under the 1988 Accord (ibid). Due to the limitations of the crude rules of 
the 1988 accord, there has been broadbased pressure to radically review this Accord. It 
can be said that in effect the review process which originated in the early 1990s, 
culminated in the publication in June 1999 of the First Consultative Package on the New 
Accord by the BCBS. This was followed by the Second Consultative Package (or CP2) in 
January 2001. As a result of this lengthy and often torturous consultative process, the 
BCBS is firmly committed to developing the New Basel Capital Accord (hereafter the 
New Accord) whose implementation is scheduled for the end of 2006.  
 
While the introduction of common minimum capital requirements against credit risk as 
specified in the 1988 Accord was primarily directed at strengthening the soundness and 
stability of internationally active G-10 banks, one today finds that the 1988 Accord has 
been adopted by more than 100 countries (Bank for International Settlements, 2001: 2). 
Undoubtedly, small states and islands also featured among these countries given that, the 
1988 Accord, in spite of its shortcomings, gradually became universally accepted as the 
minimum international benchmark that one had to adhere to. By the same token, one can 
expect that notwithstanding that the New Accord specifies that it will be applicable to 
internationally active banks – that is those with foreign branches and subsidiaries or those 
undertaking significant cross-border or Eurocurrency business (Cornford, 2001: 2) – the 
proposed Accord will in future also have to be adopted by a large number of countries 
including jurisdictions falling within the small state and island category, irrespective of 
whether or not the New Accord is suited for such small states or small operators.  
 
This paper is divided into two main parts. The first part, besides looking briefly into the 
rationale for the adoption of New Accord, is mainly devoted to reviewing its salient 
points. The second focuses on the premise that adoption of the New Accord by regulators 
responsible for small jurisdictions is virtually a foregone conclusion in spite of the fact 
that the New Accord has been drawn up primarily with internationally active banks in 
mind. Given this assumption, the remainder of the second part is devoted to evaluating 
the possible impact that implementation of the New Accord could have on small 
jurisdictions. The paper concludes by referring to the experience that Malta underwent 
when implementing the 1988 Accord and expounds on the approach which is expected to 
be adopted with respect to the New Accord so as to highlight particular problems which 
small jurisdictions might face in the future implementation of this Accord. 
 
Rationale for Adoption of the New Accord 
 
The main reasons for the adoption of the New Accord have already been hinted at in the 
introduction above. However, it is worth examining these reasons in more detail in order 
to formulate a general idea as to what led the BCBS to undertake such a drastic rework of 
the 1988 Accord. It has been said that the main attributes of the 1988 Accord could be 
summed up under six headings (Magnusson and Andonov, 2002). These relate to the: 
• financial stability aspect (the ‘safety and soundness’ consideration); 
• levelling of the competitive field (with particular regard to ‘internationally 
active’ banks); 
• introduction of minimum requirements (the 8% capital adequacy ratio); 
• standardisation element (common measure of qualifying capital); 
• prudential requirements against credit risk; 
• simplicity aspect (relatively simple to implement). 
 
Subsequent to its implementation, the 1988 Accord was hailed as having contributed 
significantly towards stopping the decline in capital held by banks from some 
jurisdictions (mainly G-10) and having ensured, “through the adoption by…[most] 
countries of common rules, that this would not lead to competitive distortions” 
(Hadjiemmanuil, 2002: 1). Notwithstanding this contribution, criticism soon started to 
emerge from both developing and developed countries on the functioning of the 1988 
Accord which forced, as will be seen below, a (radical) rethink of some of the principles 
underlying the present Accord. In fact, it has been stated that  
“... from a developing country perspective, the OECD/non-
OECD distinction in risk-weights is crude, unfair and provides 
a distorting incentive for developing countries to seek OECD 
membership. Most importantly, the lower (20%) risk-weights 
attached to short-term loans for emerging markets created a 
bias in their favour whilst credit to non-OECD banks with over 
one year maturity was discouraged by a far higher (100%) risk 
weight.” (Griffith-Jones and Spratt, 2001: 1). 
 
On the other hand, “from the perspective of international banks…current regulations i.e. 
the 1988 Accord, have created a disincentive to the holding of prime quality loans – the 
uniform 100% risk weight attributed to private borrowers – regardless of their 
creditworthiness” (Cornford, 2000: 3)]… “Consequently, banks have an incentive to hold 
a disproportionate quantity of poorer quality loans. Also of concern has been the limited 
recognition of credit mitigation instruments in the calculation of capital requirements” 
(Griffith-Jones and Spratt, 2001). 
 
Furthermore, though unsurprisingly not recognised enough in the early stages of the 
Accord’s life, there was subsequently widespread realization that “the very broad risk 
categories in the Basle Accord give scope for banks to arbitrage between their economic 
assessment of risk and the regulatory capital requirements” (BIS, 1999: 21). According to 
the research carried out by the BIS’s Working Party on Bank Capital and Behaviour to 
assess the empirical evidence on the impact of the 1988 Accord over a ten year period,  
 
 
 
 
significant amounts of securitisationrelated³ capital arbitrage have been undertaken by 
US 4, Canadian, European and Japanese banks. 
 
Therefore, the 1988 Accord though “praised for the international convergence of capital 
standards and for the improvement of these standards in many countries” (BIS, 2000:1) 
has, because of the “broad-brush nature of the risk categories” (Jackson and Emblow, 
2001: 119), been held responsible “for several distortions to the business of banking” 
(Ibid). Besides these shortcomings, the lobbying by internationally active banks to utilise 
the sophisticated systems they had developed “for commercial risk management and 
performance measurement purposes [through] internal models which estimate credit risk 
arising in significant geographical and product business lines” (Hadjiemmanuil, 2002: 3), 
as a basis for determining their regulatory capital requirements (against credit risk) 
undoubtedly was also a determining factor behind the BCBS’ decision to undertake a 
comprehensive review of the 1988 Accord. Moreover, the widespread criticism of the 
1988 Accord particularly in the second half of the 1990s coincided with a series of 
dramatic crises in the international financial world, with catastrophic contagious effects, 
especially on the financial sector in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America. These 
events led the world’s major financial organisations, including the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements, to marshal their 
resources for the formulation of a new financial architecture in order to be able to address 
the new threats and challenges facing the financial sector worldwide. 
 
Table I reproduced from the BIS consultative package of documents issued in January 
2001 summarises the reasons for the adoption of the New Accord. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
3. “Securitisation involves the sale of assets to a “special purpose vehicle” (SPV), which finances this 
purchase through issuance of asset-backed securities (ABSs) to private investors. For bankruptcy, 
accounting and regulatory purposes, SPVs generally are treated as legally separate from the sponsoring 
bank, and so are not consolidated into the sponsor’s financial statements and regulatory reports. In many 
cases, a bank can treat securitised assets as “true sales” for accounting and regulatory purposes, even 
though the bank retains most of the underlying risks through credit enhancements it provides to the ABSs”. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, 1999: 23. 
4. “As of March 1998, outstanding non-mortgage ABSs and [Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
programmes] ABCP issued by…[the ten largest US bank holding companies] exceeded $200 billion, or 
more than 12% (25%), on average, of the institutions’ total riskweighted assets (loans). For several [of 
these] institutions, the combined issuance of ABSs and ABCP approached 25% (50%) of total risk-
weighted assets (loans)”. Source: Bank for International Settlements, 1999: 26. 
Table 1 
Reasons for the Adoption of the New Accord 
 
The existing Accord            
 
The Proposed New Accord 
 
Focus on a single risk measure 
 
 
One size fits all 
 
Broad brush structure 
 
More emphasis on bank’s own 
internal methodologies, supervisory 
review, and market discipline 
Flexibility, menu of approaches, 
incentives for better risk management 
More risk sensitivity 
 
 
After the setting up by the BCBS of a Task Force on the Future of Capital Regulation in 
December 1998, the process of amending the 1988 Accord was initiated through the issue 
for comment, in June 1999, of a proposal (i.e. the First Consultative Document) to amend 
the original framework for setting capital charges for credit risk. The document also 
proposed to develop capital charges for risks not taken into account by the present 
Accord, such as interest rate risk in the banking book and operational risk (Santos, 
2000:1). Despite the issue of the Second Consultative Package in January 2001 as well as 
several working papers, press releases and impact studies, the basic structure of the New 
Accord as proposed in the First Consultative Document remains largely unchanged. 
 
The Proposed New Accord – Key Aspects 
 
This section draws extensively from the BIS document “The New Basle Capital Accord: 
An Explanatory Note”, which forms part of the 2001 package, and highlights the main 
features of the proposed New Accord. 
 
The proposed time schedule for the implementation of the New Accord is as follows: 
•October 2002 – January 2003: Third Quantitative Impact Study (QIS3) 
•Spring 2003: Third Consultative Document 
•Autumn 2003: Final Paper 
 
Parallel calculations of the old and new Capital Adequancy ratio (during 2006) with 
actual implementation of the Accord is scheduled for end 2006 for BCBS members (or 
internationally active banks) although it has been recognised that other countries may 
need more time to adopt it in its entirety (Nouy, 2002). 
 
Although perhaps not immediately apparent from the guarded words of the BCBS itself, 
the New Accord is a radical departure from the previous one. In fact:  
[t]he new framework intends to provide approaches which are both more 
comprehensive and more sensitive to risks than the 1988 Accord, while 
maintaining the overall level of regulatory capital. Capital requirements 
that are more in line with underlying risks will allow banks to manage 
their businesses more efficiently. The new framework is less prescriptive 
than the original Accord. At its simplest, the framework is somewhat 
more complex than the old, but it offers a range of approaches for banks 
capable of using more risksensitive analytical methodologies. These 
inevitably require more detail in their application and hence a thicker 
rulebook.” (Bank for International Settlements, 2001: 1). 
 
The proposed New Accord is based on three mutually reinforcing pillars that allow banks 
and supervisors to evaluate properly the various risks that banks face (Jeanneau, 2001: 
61). Accordingly, the New Accord is structured as follows: 
• First pillar: Minimum capital requirements; 
• Second pillar: Supervisory review process; 
• Third pillar: Effective use of market discipline. 
 
Pillar 1: Minimum Capital Requirements 
 
Table 2 reproduced from the BIS document – The New Basel Capital Accord: an 
Explanatory Note – summarises the principal elements found under this pillar. As can be 
expected, a substantial part of the documentation pertaining to the New Accord is taken 
up by the various methodologies and approaches falling under this pillar. 
 
Table 2 
How Capital Adequacy is Measured 
 
       Total capital (unchanged_______)                   = the bank’s capital ratio 
Credit risk + Market risk + Operational risk              (minimum 8%) 
 
Standardised Approach (a modified version of the existing approach) 
        Foundation Internal Rating Based Approach 
       Advanced Internal Rating Based Approach 
Menu of approaches to measure market risk (unchanged) 
       Standardised Approach 
       Internal Models Approach 
Menu of approaches to measure operational risk 
       Basic Indicator Approach 
      Standardised Approach 
      Internal Measurement Approach  
 
 
For the measurement of credit risk, two principal options have been proposed. The first is 
the standardised approach, and the second the internal rating based (IRB) approach. The 
standardised approach is conceptually the same as that found in the present Accord, but 
is more risk sensitive. Under this approach, the bank allocates a risk-weight to each of its 
assets and off-balance-sheet positions and produces a sum of risk-weighted asset values. 
A risk weight of 100% means that an exposure is included in the calculation of risk 
weighted assets at its full value, which translates into a capital charge equal to 8% of that 
value. Similarly, a risk weight of 20% results in a capital charge of 1.6% (i.e. one fifth of 
8%). 
Table 3 summarises the various options allowed under the standardized approach for 
slotting exposures according to ratings from eligible external rating agencies (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2001: 3-4) 
 
Under the IRB approach, banks will be allowed to use their internal estimates of 
borrower creditworthiness to assess credit risk in their portfolios, subject to strict 
methodological and disclosure standards. The use of the IRB approach will be subject to 
approval by the supervisor, based on the standards established by the BCBS in the New 
Accord. Distinct analytical frameworks will be provided for different types of loan 
exposures, for example corporate and retail lending, whose loss characteristics are 
different. Accordingly, a bank estimates each borrower’s creditworthiness, and the results 
are translated into estimates of a potential future loss amount, which form the basis of 
minimum capital requirements. The framework allows for both a foundation method and 
more advanced methodologies for corporate, sovereign and bank exposures. In the 
foundation methodology, banks estimate the probability of default associated with each 
borrower and the supervisor will supply the other inputs. In the advanced methodology, a 
bank with a sufficiently developed internal capital allocation process will be permitted to 
supply other necessary inputs as well. Under both the foundation and advanced IRB 
approaches, the range of risk weights will be far more diverse than those in the 
standardised approach, thus resulting in greater risk sensitivity. 
 
Credit risk mitigation and securitisation. The new framework introduces more risk 
sensitive approaches to the treatment of collateral, guarantees, credit derivatives, netting 
and securitisation, under both the standardised approach and the IRB approach.  
 
Operational risk. The 1988 Accord sets a capital requirement simply in terms of credit 
risk (the principal risk for banks), though the overall capital requirement (i.e., the 8% 
minimum ratio) was intended to cover other risks as well. In 1996, market risk exposures 
were removed from the framework hitherto adopted and given separate capital charges. 
In its attempt to introduce greater credit risk sensitivity, the BCBS worked with the 
industry to develop a suitable capital charge for operational risk (for example, the risk of 
loss from computer failures, poor documentation a. Risk weighting based on risk 
weighting of sovereign in which the bank is incorporated, but one category less 
favourable or fraud). Although many major banks allocate a proportion of their internal 
capital to operational risk, it should be emphasised that the work on operational risk is 
still in its developmental stage. However, three different approaches of increasing 
sophistication (basic indicator, standardised, and internal measurement) have been 
proposed in the Accord. The basic indicator approach utilises one indicator of 
operational risk for a bank’s total activity. The standardised approach specifies different 
indicators for different business lines while the internal measurement approach requires 
banks to utilise their internal loss data in the estimation of required capital. It should be 
noted that the calibration in the latest working paper relating to operational risk is based 
on 12% of the current minimum regulatory capital meaning that there has been a 
reduction from the 20% charge proposed in January 2001. 
 Table 3 
 
The Standardised Approach 
Broad Summary using Standard & Poor’s Methodology 
 
Claim 
 
Assessment 
 
 AAA 
to AA- 
A+ 
to A- 
BBB+ to 
BBB- 
BB+  
to B- 
Below  
B- 
Unrated 
Sovereigns(if Export 
Credit Agencies)  
 
 
Banks Option 1a  
Option 2b 
( 
 
0%  
(1) 
 
 
20%  
20% 
(20%)c 
20% 
(2) 
 
 
50% 
50% 
(50%)c 
50% 
(3) 
 
 
100% 
50% 
(20%)c 
100% 
(4-6) 
 
 
100% 
100% 
(50%)c 
150% 
(7) 
 
 
150% 
150% 
(150%)c 
 
100% 
(8) 
 
 
100% 
50% 
(20%)c 
    BB+  
to BB- 
 
Below  
BB- 
Unrated 
Corporates 
 
RetailMortgages 
Other retail  
 
20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100% 
 
40% 
75% 
a. Risk weighting based on risk weighting of soverign in which the bank is incorporated 
but one category less favourable. 
b. Risk weighting based on the assessment of the individual bank. 
c. Claims on banks of a short original maturity, less than three months, would generally 
receive a weighting that is one category more favourable than the usual risk weight on 
the bank’s claim. 
Source: Daniele Nouy, BIS 
 
 
 
Pillar 2: Supervisory Review Process 
 
The supervisory review process requires supervisors to ensure that each bank has sound 
internal processes in place to assess the adequacy of its capital based on a thorough 
evaluation of its risks. The new framework stresses the importance of bank management 
developing an internal capital assessment process and setting targets for capital that are 
commensurate with the bank’s particular risk profile and control environment. 
 
More specifically, the supervisory review under the New Accord is based on four 
interlocking principles (Bank of England , 2001: 57), namely: 
1. banks are required to have a process for assessing their capital requirements in relation 
to their individual risk profile. They should go beyond the scope of the Pillar 1 
minimum requirements to consider risk concentrations, areas of risk without a specific 
capital charge such as interest rate risk in the banking book, and the appropriate level of 
capital to meet their particular strategic needs; 
2. this process will be evaluated by supervisors, who will take action if they are not happy 
with any aspect of the bank’s internal process; 
3. banks are expected to operate with capital above the Pillar 1 minimum, both to reflect 
their specific profile and provide a cushion and if necessary, supervisors may use their 
powers to enforce this; 
4. supervisors should intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from falling below the 
level required to support the bank’s risk characteristics. 
 
Under the new supervisory review process, supervisors would be responsible for 
evaluating how well banks are assessing their capital adequacy needs relative to their 
risks. This internal process would then be subject to supervisory review and intervention, 
where appropriate. The implementation of these proposals will in many cases require a 
much more detailed dialogue between supervisors and banks. This in turn has 
implications for the training and expertise of bank supervisors, an area in which the 
BCBS and the BIS’s Financial Stability Institute will provide assistance. 
 
Pillar 3: Effective use of Market Discipline 
 
The third pillar of the new framework aims to bolster market discipline through enhanced 
disclosure by banks. Effective disclosure is essential to ensure that market participants 
can better understand banks’ risk profiles and the adequacy of their capital positions. The 
new framework sets out disclosure requirements and recommendations in several areas, 
including the way a bank calculates its capital adequacy and its risk assessment methods. 
The core set of disclosure recommendations applies to all banks, with more detailed 
requirements for supervisory recognition of internal methodologies for credit risk, credit 
risk mitigation techniques and asset securitisation. 
 
The Applicability of the New Accord 
 
It has been stated time and again that the scope of application of the New Accord is to 
internationally active banks. Moreover, the New Accord specifically states that it would 
be “extended to include, on a fully consolidated basis, any holding company that is the 
parent entity within a banking group to ensure that it captures the risk of the whole 
banking group” (Bank for International Settlements, 2001: 1). Therefore, because the 
New Accord differentiates between internationally active and non internationally active 
banks prima facie it would appear that the New Accord should not be applied to banks 
classified under the latter category. Despite this, the following passage shows that the 
BCBS recognizes the limitations of being categoric, and the rather narrow scope of 
application mentioned above is further qualified in the New Accord itself. 
 
Although the new framework’s focus is primarily on internationally 
active banks, its underlying principles are intended to be suitable for 
application to banks of varying levels of complexity and sophistication. 
More than 100 countries have adopted the 1988 Accord, and the 
Committee [the BCBS] has consulted with supervisors world-wide in 
developing the new framework. The goal of this effort has been to 
ensure that the principles embodied in the three pillars of the new 
framework are generally suitable to all types of banks around the globe. 
The Committee therefore expects the New Accord to be adhered to by 
all significant [my italics] banks after a certain period of time. ” (Bank 
for International Settlemetns, 2001: 9). 
 
Therefore, although the majority of banks coming from small jurisdictions might not be 
internationally active, at least a number of these banks would surely possess those 
inherent characteristics that render them significant banks in their own particular country. 
From the above it appears then that the New Accord will eventually be expected to be 
applicable to banks in different jurisdictions and of different size and sophistication, 
rather than solely to internationally active banks. 
 
Another factor which should also be considered is that “[i]n an increasingly globalised 
financial system, small countries especially small states and islands cannot afford any 
more to indulge in regulatory regimes which are less onerous than others” (Gabarretta, 
2000). While it is not within the scope of this paper to enter into detail on this aspect (see 
Gabarretta, 2001) it also worth mentioning that in recent years the Financial Stability 
Forum has, by working closely with various standard- setting bodies, succeeded in 
agreeing on best practice core standards in twelve important policy areas that promote 
financial stability by strengthening financial regulation, improving market integrity and 
facilitating better informed lending and investment decisions. 
 
Although there might be significant costs in implementing global standards relating to the 
safety and soundness aspect of banking supervision (namely, the Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision issued by the BCBS of the BIS), if a small island economy 
" .... opts not adopt them, because it envisages that the costs 
of doing so would be too high, it would be penalised on two 
counts. Firstly; stability in that economy’s financial system 
would be threatened since its institutional and regulatory 
framework would not be in line with that commonframework 
being used by others to lessen the likelihood of a financial 
crisis in the future. Secondly there would be a high degree of 
probability that foreign participation in that economy would 
not be attracted by a regime which would be deemed as too 
risky to invest in ” (Gabarretta, 2001: 13). 
 
Similarly, it can be concluded that on the basis of this premise small jurisdictions would 
have little option other than to adopt the New Accord also. 
 
 Assessment of the Potential Impact of the New Accord 
 
The request made by the BCBS for feedback on the proposals found in the January 2001 
consultative document has definitely elicited more than its fair share of comments. These 
originated from a variety of parties, ranging from the most obvious such as central banks 
and regulatory authorities, to others such as various banking associations, individual 
banks, development banks and agencies, auditing and accounting firms, consultancy 
firms and individuals. In fact, 259 replies in all have been published on the BIS website 
(www.bis.org). However, out of these replies one finds, arguably, only about 37 replies 
that had originated either from institutions coming directly from developing countries or 
from other entities that were connected in some way or other with such countries 
(primarily bankers' associations, individual banks, development banks and finance 
ministries). Moreover, out of this total less than half (15) originate from parties coming 
from small states and islands. Perusal of this, albeit small, pool of responses would shed 
light on the major concerns faced by small jurisdictions in respect of the future 
implementation of the New Accord. 
 
It should, at the same time be emphasised that, following the submission of the comments 
on the New Accord, a number of changes which have addressed some of the concerns 
expressed have been issued by the BCBS. These include extension of the timetable for 
implementation to end 2006; lower risk weight for retail exposures – from 50% to 40% 
for residentialmortgages and from 100% to 75% for other retail; reduction of the 
minimum regulatory capital for operational risk – from 20% to 12%. Therefore, using 
this source and also contemporary literature on the subject (amongst others Griffith-Jones 
and Spratt, 2001; Cornford, 2001; Parrenas, 2002), it can be postulated that the most 
significant impacts resulting from the implementation of the New Accord can be 
summarized (not in any order of significance) as follows: 
• the pro-cyclicality aspect, defined as the “amplification of financial 
and economic cycles that occurs as an unintended consequence of 
regulations” (Nouy, 2002: 9). The review of this factor will also 
highlight the close relationship of this factor with the IRB approach. 
• the complexity of the Accord and increased responsibilities for both 
supervisors and banks (Cornford, 2000: 1). 
• the possible consequences for access to and cost of international 
lending (Nouy, 2002: 10). 
• possible increase/generation in/of ‘local’ or home grown rating agencies. 
• collateral implications. 
• the question of costs and resources. 
• the competitive aspect. 
• project finance. 
• disclosure of information aspect. 
 
 
 
 
The Pro-Cyclicality Aspect 
 
This aspect has been amply covered in the literature and is also one of the most 
significant concerns in respect of the January 2001 proposals that has been voiced, albeit 
by both developed and developing countries. In fact, the charge that the New Accord 
could “exacerbate pro-cyclical tendencies within the banking system” (Griffith-Jones and 
Spratt 2001: 12) has been fully recognised by the BCBS since it seeks to reduce 
procyclicality “by finding the adequate trade-off between risk sensitivity and pro-
cyclicality and by using a few specific tools. These are (a) encouraging banks to hold 
extra capital buffers; (b) the carrying out of stress tests (for those banks using the IRB 
approach); (c) external and internal ratings should be based on long data runs” (Nouy, 
2001: 10). 
 
Griffith-Jones and Spratt make a further point that while the BCBS acknowledges that the 
New Accord could have probable pro-cyclical effects, it “believes that the benefits of a 
risk-sensitive capital framework outweigh this potential concern” (Griffith-Jones and 
Spratt 2001: 12). 
 
However, they stress that “as is the case with much of the New Accord, the trade-offs in 
terms of costs and benefits are viewed in terms of their impact on the major banks. For 
the developing world it is likely that they will feel the costs disproportionately (reduced 
lending coupled with increased scale of crises) while simultaneously attracting none of 
the benefits. ” (Griffith-Jones and Spratt 2001: 13). 
 
At the same time they premise that pro-cyclicality could be increased through future 
adoption and more widespread use of IRB approaches. To the extent that locally 
incorporated banks originating from small jurisdictions are probably not as sophisticated 
as their counterparts in developed countries 6 then one can discount their use of the IRB 
approach, at least in the initial stages after adoption of the New Accord. 
 
The result could be an increased utilisation of the standardised approach by small 
jurisdictions. As will be seen, this should not necessarily be deemed as having 
negativeconsequences. Correspondingly, it has been shown (Griffith-Jones and Spratt, 
2001: Table 5) that “adoption of the IRB approach would reduce the capital requirements 
for loans to borrowers rated BBB or above. Conversely, for borrowers rated below this, 
capital requirements will be significantly higher; the capital required [to be allocated by 
banks] under the IRB approach increases sharply as ratings fall” (Ibid). Table 4 illustrates 
this more clearly. 
 
Given this scenario, one can envisage that, in the downside of an economic cycle, those 
banks operating the standardised approach could possibly be affected less than those 
operating the IRB approach. Albeit somewhat conjectural, this supposition has far 
reaching implications for the future adoption of the more advanced approaches by small 
________________________________________________________________________ 
6. According to Laurence H. Meyer (2001) as quoted by Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001), 
“[i]n the US for example, it is estimated that only 20 of the country’s banks are likely to be in a position to 
adopt an IRB approach.” 
jurisdictions when the perceived disadvantages of this approach, compared to those of the 
standardised approach, are taken into account. 
 
Table 4 
Capital Requirements (%) as Ratings Fall 
 
Rating  
 
PD Current 
Capital 
Standardised 
Approach 
IRB 
Foundation 
 
AAA a 
 
0.03 
 
8 
 
1.6 
 
1.13 
 
AA  
 
0.03 
 
8 
 
1.6 
 
1.13 
 
A  
 
0.03 8 
 
4.0 
 
1.13 
 
BBB  
 
0.2 8 
 
8.0 3.61 
 
BB  
 
1.4 
 
8 
 
8.0 
 
12.35 
 
B  
 
6.6 
 
8 
 
12.0 
 
30.96 
 
CCC  
 
15.0 
 
8 
 
12.0 
 
47.04 
 
 
 
a.
 Floor PD of 0.03 set by the Committee (BCBS). 
Source: “Bank Capital Standards: the New Basel Accord” Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin: Spring 2001: 56. 
 
Complexity of the Accord and Related Responsibilities 
 
This is another example of those issues that have given rise to substantial concerns on the 
part of both supervisors and banks coming particularly from developing countries. Thus, 
it has been noted that the burden on regulators will increase significantly both due to the 
responsibilities emanating from the supervisory review process set out in Pillar II and 
also through the operational risk framework and an (eventual) adoption of the IRB 
approach (Central Bank of Malta, 2001: 7). At the same time, given the detail in which 
the supervisory review process goes into, extra care on the part of supervisors will be 
required so as not to appear too paternalistic. 
 
The Pillar II proposals have also been criticised (Racocha, 2002) as not having a very 
clear demarcation line between the responsibilities of the banks themselves and those of 
the supervisors. The latter must ensure that their duties do not appear to encroach in any 
way on those areas that should be the exclusive reserve of banks’ management (Central 
Bank of Malta, 2001: 6). This effect could arguably be more of an issue in small 
jurisdictions than much larger ones possibly due to a higher level of expertise at 
regulatory agencies than in the financial institutions themselves. 
In other words, “the complexity of the Accord would bring about high compliance and 
implementation costs, not only for banking institutions in…[small states and islands] but 
also for regulators, who might not have enough resources to analyse and validate the 
procedures set up by local banks, and by local subsidiaries of international financial 
conglomerates” (Resti, 2002: 20). 
 
The Competitive Aspect 
 
It has been seen earlier on that the purported disadvantage of utilizing the IRB approach 
instead of the standardised approach could prima facie preclude the majority of banks in 
small jurisdictions from using the former approach. This also has implications regarding 
their competitive position. As such, in those small jurisdictions where international 
financial services centres located there contribute substantially to these economies, it is 
not unrealistic to assume that ‘local’ banks compete directly with any internationally 
active banks present. The latter category of banks would be able to utilise the more 
advanced approaches requiring less capital while less developed banks, in an attempt to 
switch to these approaches (as envisaged after all in the New Accord ), would find it 
extremely complicated and demanding to do so in the short to medium term (Griffith-
Jones Spratt, 2001: 2). The result of this could ultimately be greater consolidation in the 
banking industry with more internationally active banks and less ‘local’ banks in small 
jurisdictions. 
 
Implications for International Lending 
 
On this issue the implementation by small jurisdictions of the New Accord could result in 
negative consequences on three counts, namely through: 
• a decrease in the overall level of access to international capital 
through the possible consolidation in the banking sector (as outlined in the previous 
point); 
• the higher risk profile of the majority of borrowers coming from small jurisdictions 
resulting from a historical propensity towards low ratings 7 
could result in higher cost of credit as a direct consequence of both the application of 
the Standardised and IRB approaches and 
• the consequent rise in the price of loans could cause an upsurge in the cost of credit not 
only for governments and banks in small jurisdictions through the rise in the ‘risk-free’ 
base rates to which credit spreads on private loans are added (Resti, 2002: 20). 
 
Activities of ‘Local’ or ‘Home-grown’ Rating Agencies 
 
The standardised approach found in the New Accord assigns risk weights for exposures 
to various types of counterparties based on the assessments of external credit assessment 
________________________________________________________________________ 
7. Out of a sample of 50 developing countries’ sovereign ratings rated by Standard and Poor’s as at June 27 
2002, only 2 sovereigns (highest A- and lowest BBB-) – which could be classified as being small states or 
islands – out of a total of 18 countries rated at Investment Grade (up to BBB-) qualified for this rating. 
Moreover, out of the remaining 
32 classified as being Sub-Investment Grade (below BB+), 5 others (highest BB- and lowest B-) were small 
jurisdictions also (Griffith-Jones Spratt, 2002: 54). 
institutions (ECAIs) – more commonly known as rating agencies. Notwithstanding that 
the incentive to move to more sophisticated approaches is inherent in the structure of the 
New Accord, one can safely say that the Standardised Approach will be used by most 
banks in both developed and developing countries. Moreover, the New Accord provides 
national supervisors the possibility of determining whether an ECAI meets a number of 
eligibility criteria in order for its ratings 7 to be used for capital purposes as laid down in 
the standardised methodology. 
 
Hence, one can envisage that in developing countries and in small jurisdictions, where 
the coverage by the major ECAIs of ‘local’ companies and banks in extremely low, there 
could be a need for more ‘localised’ rating agencies which would specialise in assessing 
local companies and banks. However, the issue is not as straightforward as it looks since 
these agencies have to fulfil the eligibility criteria for recognition by the regulators of 
small jurisdictions as laid down in the New Accord. Additionally, it should be 
emphasised that the ratings resulting from these localised rating agencies have to be 
‘mapped’ by regulators so that a risk weight assignment would be consistent with that of 
the level of credit risk found in Table 3 above. Only through this process can it be 
determined whether the use of mapped ‘local’ ratings would be cost-effective with 
respect to the general 100% risk-weight for unrated exposures stipulated in the New 
Accord. 
 
Recognition and Valuation of Collateral Implications 
 
The New Accord proposes to adopt a very restrictive definition of commercial real estate. 
Accordingly, the BCBS holds the view that mortgages on commercial real estate do not 
in principle justify other than a 100% weighting of the loans secured. However, several 
countries drew attention to the fact that “commercial real estate tends to be a more 
important source of collateral in developing than developed countries owing to the more 
underdeveloped state of financial markets in the former and thus the lesser availability of 
financial instruments suitable for this purpose.” Given the rather limited range of 
collateral instruments eligible for recognition in the (simple approach of the) 
standardized approach (see above) it has been proposed that, “subject to appropriate 
haircuts to allow for the volatility of the value of such property, commercial real estate 
should be recognised as allowable collateral alongside of the eligible financial 
instruments under the standardized approach” (Cornford, 2000: 6). 
 
Costs and Resources 
 
In view of the much higher complexity of the New Accord regime, the cost of setting up 
an appropriate Basel II – compliant risk control system is likely to be a formidable 
challenge for both banks and regulators. It has been estimated that the implementation 
and compliance costs – using a net present value basis over a 5 year period with a 5% 
reference rate – of Basel II could possibly exceed US$1,000 billion (Resti, 2002: 30). 
This is equivalent to about one half of the value of Tier One capital held by banks 
worldwide. In other words, the first impact of the reform in the New Accord – which 
supposedly is intended to improve the banks’ capital adequacy – could possibly be to 
erode a substantial share of such capital (ibid). The question of costs resulting particularly 
from implementation of the first two pillars of the New Accord could impact even more 
acutely on small jurisdictions in a number of ways. Thus, it is likely that the adoption by 
banks of the more sophisticated approaches found in the New Accord could require a 
huge cost outlay especially if the concept of internal ratings is a new one for these 
jurisdictions. At the same time the issue of cost-effectiveness in this regard cannot be 
ignored. Would it be feasible for local banks in small jurisdictions to go for the more 
advanced approaches if the benefits of doing so are not so marked? Further to this, the 
need for additional human resources in the supervisory functions could penalise 
particularly small jurisdictions where technically proficient personnel is relatively scarce 
(Central Bank of Malta, 2001: 6) and prone to being ‘poached’ or, at the very least, to 
‘capture’ (see Persaud, 2002). 
 
Project Finance 
 
The current proposals of the New Accord assume that project finance is of higher risk 
than corporate lending, implying an increase in capital requirements for loans belonging 
to the former category. Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2000; 55) note that this could be 
particularly problematic for developing countries, which require very large private 
investment in infrastructure for their development, and project finance is often the key 
mechanism to achieve this. While this is certainly fundamental for larger jurisdictions it 
is perhaps of less concern for small jurisdictions possibly in view of the latter’s somewhat 
different macroeconomic framework. 
 
Disclosure of Information 
 
A recurrent theme in the comments of developing countries involved disclosure issues 
mainly covered under Pillar III of the New Accord and centred on two issues (Cornford, 
2000:8). The first concerned the way “in which financial markets in developing countries 
[and by implication, small jurisdictions also] would absorb and respond to the greater 
disclosure [provisions found in the New Accord]” while the second applied to the 
competitive effects resulting therefrom. Hence, a typical comment stated that “in small 
economies with a limited number of large corporations in particular sectors, certain 
disclosure requirements [as envisaged in the New Accord], in particular the publishing of 
details of past due/ impaired loans, could lead to the disclosure of proprietary data.” 
(Central Bank of Malta, 2001: 7). In fact, other comments also referred “to market 
participants’ capacity to interpret the increased information resulting from enhanced 
disclosure, some going even so far as to suggest that such disclosure could be a source of 
financial instability” (Cornford, 20900: 8). The second is obviously related to the first 
and is concerned with “the likelihood of pressures associated with the rules of the New 
Accord for disclosure of proprietary information of a kind capable of unfavourably 
affecting a bank’s competitive position” (ibid). 
 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
There are many repercussions which could affect small jurisdictions (though not 
exclusively) when the New Accord is implemented, as explained above. This, in turn, 
suggests that the intervening period up to implementation can be used to try to mitigate as 
far as possible the negative implications for small jurisdictions. 
 
 One important issue that, perhaps, was taken for granted, is that all the literature 
produced to date describing the implications arising from implementation of the New 
Accord – this paper not excluded – is totally conjectural or better, is the result of an ex-
ante analysis. Evidently, it is only after a certain amount of time has passed subsequent to 
implementation of the New Accord that a valid and meaningful ex-post analysis can be 
obtained. However, with respect to the central topic of this paper, from whatever 
perspective one looks at it, this latter situation is definitely not ideal. On the other hand, 
an ex-ante analysis is extremely useful in that it could enable one to identify certain 
difficulties inherent in the current proposals. Furthermore, since the analyses have to date 
been carried out using Consultative Papers II or I as the models for the New Accord it is 
possible that these studies are too pessimistic on certain areas of the Accord. 
Accordingly, the very fact that a significant amount of contemporary literature has 
pointed out certain deficiencies in the proposed Accord could result in, at least, a partial 
redressing of these issues in the final version of the New Accord. In that case some of the 
implications outlined above could perhaps not have so deep an effect on small 
jurisdictions. 
 
That the BCBS is fully cognisant of certain undesirable effects of the proposed New 
Accord – in its present form – is evident by the number of studies it has carried out and is 
still carrying out in order to try to achieve as far as possible the same level of overall 
capital as the current Accord. In fact, the BCBS is currently undertaking a fourth 8 
 so-called Quantitative Impact Study (QIS 3). This is intended to provide some more 
insight into the BCBS’ perspective to revise the current Accord; including if need be any 
major elements of the proposals that will be tested by the banking industry during the 
QIS3. It is estimated that about 300 banks from about 50 countries are participating in 
this study. Hence, the importance of this exercise especially for small jurisdictions cannot 
be emphasized enough. If through a wide participation from this category the results of 
this study confirm that there is certainly room for improvement then it – the current study 
– commenced in Autumn 2002. could be possible to calibrate the forthcoming proposals 
(CP3 ) so as to eliminate or at least mitigate as much as possible those effects, some of 
which have been postulated above. 
 
At the same time it should be stressed that the level of consultation and information on 
the proposals relating to the New Accord is very high. Furthermore, apart from the QIS3 
there are other fora, where small jurisdictions are also represented. These fora have put 
the message across in the sense that the proposals are not to be construed as being a fait 
accompli but still leave room for amendment on certain crucial aspects in order to 
________________________________________________________________________ 
8. QIS1 started in Autumn 2000, QIS2 in Summer 2001, QIS 2.5 in Autumn 2001 and QIS3 – the current 
study – commenced in Autumn 2002 
achieve the least possible negative impact on these jurisdictions. In this regard one can 
think of the sterling work which the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) of the BIS has been 
carrying out, for a number of years, now on the various aspects of the proposed New 
Accord. Thus, attendance by regulators and supervisors coming from small jurisdictions 
at the numerous seminars/training workshops which are going to be organised in the 
coming months and years by the FSI could contribute significantly to the furthering of 
their knowledge on what is definitely, a complex piece of regulation. 
 
It goes without saying that the coming years are going to be extremely tough and 
challenging for both developed and developing countries since they have to marshal all 
available resources in order to implement the New Accord by 2006. On the other hand, if 
one takes Malta as an example of how a small island state plans to undertake such a 
momentous task, one immediately recognises that, for various reasons, the challenges 
facing all the participants in the local banking system could be far higher for this category 
of jurisdiction than if this financial system was more developed, deep and sophisticated 
and enjoying the presence of major global players. Thus, in the coming months, using the 
limited resources available to regulators, it is probable that a core group of ‘experts’ 
together with representatives from the banks and the banking association would start to 
meet on a regular basis in order to: 
• understand further the concepts of the New Accord; 
• exchange all relevant information including the possibility of sharing certain data 
among the banks; 
• discuss, analyse and recommend action required; 
• disseminate information to the public in respect of the capital adequacy structure and 
publish articles both of general interest and in academic journals; 
• collect data to determine its ‘quality’ with a view to its eventual possible utilisation for   
the more advanced approaches. 
 
This paper has highlighted some of the implications which could result from the 
implementation of the New Accord. As seen above, many of the implications, besides 
straining the scarce resources of small jurisdictions, could ex-ante result in negative 
effects that would impact on the financial systems of these jurisdictions in a number of 
ways. However, the overriding objective for the implementation of the New Capital 
Accord should have a beneficial and positive effect for all jurisdictions even at the cost of 
possible increases in capital requirements particularly for small jurisdictions. If, on the 
other hand, through the future implementation of the New Accord, overall improvements 
by using better risk assessment techniques and practices for all jurisdictions are achieved, 
then the increasingly globalised financial system would have moved closer to achieving a 
higher level of financial stability through the much-trumpeted safety and soundness 
objectives. 
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